chore: establish local platform baseline
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Codex Local
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
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package contentpolicy
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"regexp"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"data-terminal-cloud/internal/outbox"
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)
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type Decision struct {
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AllowOrdinaryStory bool
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Sensitivity string
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Reason string
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ProviderRef string
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RequestRef string
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}
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type Classifier interface {
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Classify(context.Context, string) (Decision, error)
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}
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type LocalClassifier struct{}
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var (
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verificationCodePattern = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(验证码|校验码|动态码|verification\s*code|otp)[^0-9]{0,8}[0-9]{4,8}`)
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accountNumberPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`(?:^|[^0-9])[0-9]{12,19}(?:[^0-9]|$)`)
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promptInjectionPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(忽略.{0,16}(以上|之前|所有).{0,16}(指令|规则|提示)|(?:泄露|输出|显示).{0,20}(系统提示|密钥|其他.{0,8}(用户|长者|家庭))|ignore\s+(all\s+)?(previous|prior)\s+instructions|reveal.{0,20}(system\s+prompt|secret|other\s+user))`)
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)
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var sensitiveMedicalTerms = []string{"艾滋", "hiv", "癌症", "肿瘤", "精神病", "精神科", "诊断结果", "病理报告"}
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var paymentTerms = []string{"银行卡", "银行账号", "信用卡", "支付密码", "取款密码", "转账"}
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// Classify applies a conservative local safety baseline before ordinary story
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// generation. It is intentionally rule-based and must be supplemented by a
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// production content-safety service and evaluated policy set.
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func Classify(content string) Decision {
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normalized := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(content))
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if verificationCodePattern.MatchString(normalized) {
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return localDecision(false, "high", "verification_code")
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}
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if accountNumberPattern.MatchString(normalized) && containsAny(normalized, paymentTerms) {
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return localDecision(false, "high", "financial_account")
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}
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if promptInjectionPattern.MatchString(normalized) {
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return localDecision(false, "high", "prompt_injection")
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}
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if containsAny(normalized, sensitiveMedicalTerms) {
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return localDecision(false, "sensitive", "sensitive_medical")
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}
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return localDecision(true, "normal", "")
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}
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func (LocalClassifier) Classify(_ context.Context, content string) (Decision, error) {
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return Classify(content), nil
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}
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func localDecision(allow bool, sensitivity, reason string) Decision {
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return Decision{
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AllowOrdinaryStory: allow,
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Sensitivity: sensitivity,
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Reason: reason,
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ProviderRef: "local-content-safety-policy",
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}
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}
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type ManagedClassifier struct {
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endpoint string
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apiKey string
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policyRef string
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client *http.Client
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}
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func NewManagedClassifier(endpoint, apiKey, policyRef string, timeout time.Duration) (*ManagedClassifier, error) {
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endpoint = strings.TrimSpace(endpoint)
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apiKey = strings.TrimSpace(apiKey)
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policyRef = strings.TrimSpace(policyRef)
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parsed, err := url.Parse(endpoint)
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if err != nil || parsed.Host == "" || (parsed.Scheme != "http" && parsed.Scheme != "https") {
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return nil, errors.New("content safety endpoint must be an absolute HTTP(S) URL")
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}
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if apiKey == "" || policyRef == "" || timeout <= 0 {
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return nil, errors.New("content safety API key, policy reference and positive timeout are required")
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}
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return &ManagedClassifier{
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endpoint: endpoint, apiKey: apiKey, policyRef: policyRef,
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client: &http.Client{Timeout: timeout},
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}, nil
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}
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// Classify always applies the local high-risk rules before sending content to
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// the managed policy service. Local matches therefore never leave the process.
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func (c *ManagedClassifier) Classify(ctx context.Context, content string) (Decision, error) {
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if decision := Classify(content); !decision.AllowOrdinaryStory {
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return decision, nil
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}
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requestBody, err := json.Marshal(struct {
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PolicyRef string `json:"policy_ref"`
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Content string `json:"content"`
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}{PolicyRef: c.policyRef, Content: content})
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if err != nil {
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return Decision{}, err
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}
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, c.endpoint, bytes.NewReader(requestBody))
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if err != nil {
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return Decision{}, fmt.Errorf("build content safety request: %w", err)
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}
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+c.apiKey)
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "voice-platform-content-safety/1.0")
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resp, err := c.client.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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return Decision{}, outbox.Retryable(fmt.Errorf("call content safety service: %w", err))
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}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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body, readErr := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
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if readErr != nil {
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return Decision{}, outbox.Retryable(fmt.Errorf("read content safety response: %w", readErr))
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}
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if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
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requestErr := fmt.Errorf("content safety service returned HTTP %d", resp.StatusCode)
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if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusRequestTimeout || resp.StatusCode == http.StatusTooEarly || resp.StatusCode == http.StatusTooManyRequests || resp.StatusCode >= 500 {
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return Decision{}, outbox.Retryable(requestErr)
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}
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return Decision{}, requestErr
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}
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var result struct {
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Decision string `json:"decision"`
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Sensitivity string `json:"sensitivity"`
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ReasonCode string `json:"reason_code"`
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RequestRef string `json:"request_ref"`
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}
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if err = json.Unmarshal(body, &result); err != nil {
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return Decision{}, outbox.Retryable(errors.New("content safety response is not valid JSON"))
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}
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result.Decision = strings.ToUpper(strings.TrimSpace(result.Decision))
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result.Sensitivity = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(result.Sensitivity))
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result.ReasonCode = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(result.ReasonCode))
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if (result.Decision != "ALLOW" && result.Decision != "BLOCK" && result.Decision != "REVIEW") ||
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(result.Sensitivity != "normal" && result.Sensitivity != "sensitive" && result.Sensitivity != "high") ||
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!validReasonCode(result.ReasonCode, result.Decision == "ALLOW") {
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return Decision{}, outbox.Retryable(errors.New("content safety response failed schema validation"))
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}
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return Decision{
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AllowOrdinaryStory: result.Decision == "ALLOW",
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Sensitivity: result.Sensitivity,
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Reason: result.ReasonCode,
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ProviderRef: "managed-content-safety:" + c.policyRef,
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RequestRef: strings.TrimSpace(result.RequestRef),
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}, nil
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}
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func validReasonCode(value string, allowEmpty bool) bool {
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if value == "" {
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return allowEmpty
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}
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if len(value) > 64 {
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return false
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}
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for _, character := range value {
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if (character < 'a' || character > 'z') && (character < '0' || character > '9') && character != '_' && character != '-' {
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return false
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}
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}
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return true
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}
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func containsAny(content string, terms []string) bool {
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for _, term := range terms {
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if strings.Contains(content, term) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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